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Contingencies for the Emergence 
of Efficient Symbiotic Arrangements 
There is an increasing variety of concepts dealing with organizational forms 
between pure markets and pure hierarchies, e.g. relational contracting (MAC- 
NEIL [1974], WILLIAMSON [1985]), hybrid forms of organization (WILLJAMSON 
[1988]), symbiotic contracts (SCHANZE [1991]), strategic alliances and coopera- 
tions (SCHRADER [1993], STRAUTMANN [1993], HARRIGAN [1986]), and strategic 
networks (AOKI [1984], SYDOW [1991]). These and similar modes of interorga- 
nizational coordination are characterized by the following properties: 
- long-term orientation (open-ended or limited for a long duration), 
- incomplete contracts, 
- mutual dependency in the "symbiotic field" while guarding the autonomy of 
both sides in terms of property rights, 
- mutual adjustment of behavioral rules and culture. 
Jt is the purpose of this short paper to present general contingencies for the 
emergence of such symbiotic arrangements (2.) and to give guidelines for the 
selection of concrete forms of symbiotic arrangements according to the respec- 
tive form of resource interdependence (3.). A short outlook (4.) will exemplify 
the use of these economic concepts in practical design of organizations and in 
consulting. 
2. General Contingencies for Symbiotic Arrarigsrnenls 
Following standard transaction cost theory (e.g. WILLIAMSON [1985], PICOT 
[1991], PICOT and FRANCK [1993]) division of labor calls for 
- classical market contracts, if highly standardized (i.e. non-specific) inputs 
(goods or services) have to be coordinated, 
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- hierarchical organization, in particular emploj~ment contracts, if highly 
specific (i.e. non-standard) inputs are at stake, 
- hybrid forms of organization (relational contracts, alliances, cooperation 
etc.) if inputs \frith a niedium level of specificity have to become part of the 
dt-rwn-stream output. 
Figure 1 depicts the relation between specificity, transaction costs and coordi- 
nation mode (WILLIAMSON [1991]). 
This theory implies that 
- increasing specificity also increases transaction costs, 
- the more integrative the organizational mode the less costly (in terms of 
transaction costs) is the management of specificity, 
- in ZL competitive econoinic environment high levels of transaction costs as a 
consequence of highly specific tasks can only be justified if these specific 
aczivities contribute to the unique entrepreneurial performance or, in other 
wc~ds,  to the potential competitive advantage of a firm. 
The latter argument underlines that vertical integration, i.e. make-options 
should only be used for l~ighly specific and strategically critical business activ- 
ities. Strategically relevant activities or inputs iinply high specificity by which 
a fir~n difkren~iates itself in a dynamic competitive world. Semi-specific inputs 
cannot yet be substituted by standard goods or services mainly because they 
must he adapted to the highly specific core activities of the firm. Therefore. they 
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have to be coordinated with external suppliers in a symbiotic arrangement. 
Such an arrangement offers not only safeguards against mutual opportunism, 
but also an adequate framework for mutual task-related understanding and 
communication. 
2.2 Techrzology 
Transaction costs can be interpreted as costs of information and communica- 
tion that have to be taken into account in order to come to a consensus on an 
equitable exchange. Costs of information and communication relate to all 
activities within a transaction such as search for alternatives, negotiation of 
conditions, management of task performance and exchange, checking of qual- 
ities, quantities, and prices, as well as adaptation to changes during fulfillment 
of the transaction. To the extent that information and communication tech- 
nologies can economize on exchange related costs, transaction costs will de- 
crease with adoption of such technologies (e.g. PICOT [1989]). It is widely 
accepted that information and communication technology reduces many costs 
of information and communication. Telecommunications as well as informa- 
tion technology facilitate contacts, negotiations, and data exchange, they sup- 
port management processes and allow for cooperation even over long spatial 
distances than without such technologies. Suppose that telecommunications 
and information technology lead to a reduction of fixed and variable costs of 
transacting, figure 1 will be transformed as shown in figure 2. 
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As can be seen the critical amount of specificity for switching from one 
organizational mode to another is shifting to the right. This means that an 
increase in specificity can in these instances be handled by markets or symbiotic 
arrangements. Information and communication technology facilitates interor- 
ganizntional cooperation and therefore opens options for new outsourcing 
opportunities and for new forms of coordination within the value chain. Not 
only information and communication technology in the narrow sense of the 
word but also other technological innovatiol~s in organization, distribution and 
production, especially creatioil of technical standards, construction of new 
contractual arrangements such as franchising, allow for a broader scope of 
interorganizational arrangements. Examples are just in time-supply of specific 
goods. CAD/CAM cooperaticrn between independent finlls, electronic data 
interchange bctween organizations as basis for new forms of intercompany 
logistics. 
Sn far, semi-specific inputs seem to be the inain contingency for symbiotic 
arraagements between organizations. This tendency is even fostered by new 
technologies that support actual activities. However, there are at least two 
qualifications to this standard view of transaction cost theory as will be shourn 
in the following two paragraphs. 
The above outlined contingencies for the emergence of symbiotic organization- 
al arrangements presuppose a low or "normal" degree of environmental uncer- 
tainty. As sooil as enviroisinsntal uncertainty increases and continues to prevail 
on a high level the arguments must be modified in fa.vor of interorganizational 
arrangements even for rather high specific inputs. High uncertainty means that 
the economic actor must permanently take into account numerous potential 
changes in demand, technology, prices, products, conipetilion etc. Qualitative 
as wcll as quantitative properties of these changes are fuzzy and cannot be 
predicted in any exact way. This also implies that the economic duration of 
specific investments tends to become shorter. Under such circumstances invest- 
ing in highly specific and strategically important activities is even illore risky 
than it is under "normal" uncertainty. Thus, the investor looks for opportuni- 
ties of risk-bearing and risk-sharing. He or she will intensify the search for 
standardization and outsourcing of specific activities, which also will result in 
more relational contra.cting with the outside world than before. Furthermore 
and perhaps even more importailt he or she is now more willing than before to 
engage in quasi-integration with others even in fields of highly specific en- 
trepreneurial activity. Thereby lhe parties involved can also benefit from the 
econoniies of scale and scope that one party alone could grasp only at very high 
risk. Symbiotic arrangements in highly specific and strategically important 
activities ca.n be found under high uncertainty especially in the field of research 
and development projects, but they can also be observed in other fields such as 
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production and marketing. It must be noted, that such symbiotic arrangements 
will normally not result in classical full-scale mergers or acquisitions, because 
this would lead to an accumulation rather than to a dispersion of risk. Symbi- 
otic arrangements will ensure the property rights autonomy of each party by 
dividing the overall entrepreneurial task and by dealing with numerous partners 
thereby diversifying the risk. 
Increasing environmental uncertainty with the implication of shortened 
product life cycles is a typical characteristic of the economic situation in many 
industries during the recent past. This is a result of intensified global competi- 
tion and of the augmentation and diffusion of knowledge. Therefore it is not 
surprising that symbiotic arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ven- 
tures, long-term cooperations in special fields, can be found more often than 
before. Of course, availability of transaction cost reducing technologies sup- 
ports the use of these organizational options. 
2.4 Entry barriers 
The afore-mentioned increase of dynamics and uncertainty creates still another 
strategic problem: as conditions for entrepreneurial success tend to change 
more rapidly devaluation of those highly specific competencies that used to 
form the strategic core of the firm, becomes more probable and occurs more 
frequently. Thereby the firm's existence is endangered. In order to overcome 
that challenge firms will build up, improve or even substantially differentiate 
competencies as a future basis of existence in the market. In other words: the 
capability for organizational learning gains even more critical importance for 
a firm's viability in a competitive environment. Assuming that strategic man- 
agement can identify vital fields for future success - which is not at all self- 
evident - the question arises whether one should try to create the necessary 
knowledge by internal means (training of existing employees, hiring of qualified 
personnel, internal diffusion of knowledge, pilot projects etc). In many cases 
(e.g. switching from mechanical engineering to electronic design and systems 
integration) this option turns out to be too costly and too slow. Very often, due 
to the implicit and tacit character of such knowledge, acquisition and applica- 
tion of relevant know-how depends on specific external experiences and condi- 
tions that cannot be transferred and reconstructed rapidly enough nor at ac- 
ceptable costs. 
Entry barriers to new knowledge are always high. However, they are often 
lower if one tries to directly cooperate with those external organizations that 
already use at least parts of that particular knowledge. In order to allow that 
external knowledge to penetrate into one's own organization some sort of 
symbiotic arrangement may be required. Joint projects between the firm and 
external, experienced partners (research organizations, firms in the same or in 
other industries) are therefore suitable arrangements for a quick and reliable 
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transfer of knowledge. Of course, such arrangements must rely on reciprocity 
and on a maximum of mutual trust and fairness. 
Thus. symbiotic arrangements become a strategic instrument for the develop- 
ment of f~tture core competences of a fim. With increasing market dynamics 
this form of organizational learning becomes even more important. It must be 
stressed that this kind of symbiotic arrangement occurs not only once or twice 
for one B m ,  but calls for various cooperative agreements with all sorts of 
external organizations that contain some aspects of the targeted fields of expe- 
rience and knowledge. It can be observed that con~panies which act in the 
described way gain a leading edge in a new field more quickly than others 
(PRAHALAD and H A ~ L  119901). 
3. Annljvis qf Resozirce Interdependence as Basis for tlze Selectioiz 
o f  Corlcrete Il.fodes 
3.1 Resource Ii9terdt.perzclence 
Spccificity, technology, uncertainty, and entry barriers seeill to form the main 
determinants for the emergence of symbiotic arrangements in industrial organi- 
zation. However, this intermediate result does not answer the question as to 
what ~oncrete organizational form of symbiotic arrangements should be cho- 
sen. Should it be more integrative (e.g. mutual holding of minority shares of 
equlty) or less integrative (e.g. licensing agreement)? 
An analysis of the prevailing resource interdependence between the parties 
involved can help to guide the design of hybrid forms of organization. Impor- 
tant insights into this relationship have been provided by TEECE [1986]. This 
sec~ion elaborates more deeply on this subject, relying to a large extent on 
DIETL [l9931 ; see also PICOT, DIETL and FRANCK [1994]. 
A n  economically viable symbiotic arrangement requires at least some partici- 
pating parties dedicating resources thereby producing higher benefits viewed 
froin a separated use. Thus, resources relevant to the symbiotic arrangement 
may be called interdependent. It is the prevailing characteristic pattern of the 
respective resource interdependence that shapes the efficient design of a symbi- 
otic arrangement. There are three different characteristics of resources that 
have to be taken into account: dependency, potency, plasticity. 
Lleperrde~?cy of resources is given if this resource yields higher results in 
combination with a resource of another firm as compared to a separated use 
(e.g. knowledge unfolded in a team compared to isolated use of knowledge). 
A resource can be called possessing yolelzcy if other resources depend on this 
resource but not vice versa (e.g. the continuation of a business may depend on 
the prolongation of a bank credit). If a resource is dependent but not potent, 
then there exists a one sided dependence. 
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Table 1 
A's resources 
dependent potent and with potent and with 
low plasticity high plasticity 
B's 
potent and 
with high 
plasticity 
I plasticity I share of B 
1) integration of 3) B holding 5 )  joint venture 
resources (minority) 
(acquisition or share of A 
merger) 
resources 
Plasticity of resources (ALCHIAN and WOODWORD [1987]) relates to the fact 
that the kind of use of some resources can hardly be predicted. The more 
difficult it is to assess the kind of use of some resource the more plastic is that 
resource (often lcnowledge workers may be viewed as plastic resources). 
3.2 A Frunze~vork for Designing E f f i e n t  Symbiotic Arrarzge~ne~its 
potent and 
with low 
Given these resource characteristics and assuming that two firms (A and B) are 
to form a symbiotic arrangement we may distinguish between several typical 
situations. Following DIETL [l9931 each situation demands a particular form of 
efficient symbiotic arrangement (table 1). 
Only one of the two firms may possess dependent resources (i.e. one sided 
dependence). Furthermore one may distinguish between situations with potent 
resources on both sides (i.e. mutual dependence) and low or high plasticity of 
resources respectively. Thus, six potential combinations can be discerned. 
ad 1. If firm A's resources depend on potent and highly plastic resources of 
firm B, this one sided dependence is permanently endangered by hold-up risks 
and moral hazard. Assume that firm A owns production facilities whose eco- 
nomic benefits heavily depend 011 implicit engineering knowledge embodied in 
firm B. Due to that agency situation firm A will have considerable difficulties 
in monitoring firm B's use of knowledge. The only efficient solution to this 
situation lies in establishing a unified management of resources based on inte- 
grated property rights (e.g. through acquisition of majority shares or through 
merger). 
ad 2. If firm B's potent resources are characterized by low plasticity (firm A's 
resources still being dependent) the efficient solution looks different. Now 
necessary inputs from B can be satisfactorily defined and transferred within a 
more or less complex contract, e.g. within a licensing agreement. Of course, 
such contracts are to some degree incomplete, i.e. relational. They need accoin- 
2) licensing 4) consortium 6) A holding 
(minority j 
pallying mutual communication, understanding, trust and advice. However, 
the economic core of the symbiotic arrangement can be formulated in contrac- 
tual terms and be monitored by checking whether predefined goods, services, 
or information have been supplied or not. Licensing a.greements for production 
of sreel, chernicals. or trucks with conipanies in third ulorld countries may serve 
as illustratior~s. 
iiil3 and 6. If both sides dispose of potent resources, n~utual dependence is 
given. However, the firm whose resources are more plastic has a strategic 
advantage over the other beca~~se the monitoring of its contribution to the 
colnrnon undertaking is more difficult. The resulting problem of moral hazard 
needs to be reduced. 4 n  efficient solution to that situation is a share of equity 
held by the firm with higher plasticity of resources in the symbiotic arrange- 
ment. This capital investment serves as a security for the side with less plastic 
resources. This security will not lead the other party to an opportunistic ex- 
ploitation of its degrees of freedom offered by the higher plasticity of its 
resources. In many cases a minority share will suffice in order to economically 
stabilize such arrangements. An example is the cooperation between airlines 
and hotel chains or rental car cooperations. Such arrangements are often 
founded on nlinoritp shares held by the a.irline. 
ud4. In the case o i  mutual dependence with equally lour plasticity of re- 
sources a consortiun~ turns out to be the efficient form of arrangement. Both 
parlies commit tl~emselves to a conlnlon imnplernentation of rather well defined 
projects thereby benefitting from synergies of resources and reduction of risk. 
Examples are consortia in the field of' large engineering projects or consortia for 
the issue and sale of financial securities. 
crd5. If both parties dedicate potent and highly plastic resources to the 
cooperative arrangement this situation opens up opportunities for moral haz- 
a.rd behavior on both sides. As the respective contributions cannot be adequate- 
ly n~onitored by the other side (this is at least the case in the beginning of the 
cooperation) each party may be induced to perform less than contracted. A 
party that behaves opportul~istically, can grasp the cost advantages of such 
behavior, whereas the resulting reductions of benefit are shared by both. This 
problem can be most efficiently restrained if each party transfers its potent and 
plastic resources into a common cooperation, a joint venture. A commonly 
owned organization with integrated resources facilitates mutual monitoring. 
reduces inducement for opportuilistic behavior, furthers development of mutu- 
al understanding and conlmon culture, and, thereby, supports the achievement 
01 the common goals. Examples can be found in resea.rc11 and development joint 
ventures that are equipped with qualified personnel and technical resources of 
both sides representing the respective implicit knowledge. 
So far we have only looked at the design of symbiotic arrangements between 
two parties. The arguments made can also be extended to arrangements with 
m.ultiple partnas thereby explaining the efficient design of networks and lteiret- 
SUS. 
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4. Using Theory and Practice 
Many parts of the above theoretical arguments, especially those discussed in 
section two, have been used in consulting projects. Only a part of that experi- 
ence is published (e.g. PICOT [1991], PICOT and GOEKE [1993], PICOT and WOLFF 
[1994], BAUR [1990], STRAUTMANN [1993], GERHARD, NIPPA and PICOT [1992]). 
In most cases the starting point for those projects was a differentiated make-or- 
buy analysis using a transaction cost framework (PICOT [1991]). Froin there 
only a few steps are needed in order to find and design those activities that need 
to be organized in some form of symbiotic arrangement. 
Beginning with a systematic list of all relevant functions, activities, processes, 
or competencies of a firm, each item of that list has to be evaluated in terms of 
the theory presented. This is mainly done by intensive individual interviews or 
in group workshops. Of course, the theory has to be operationalized so that 
practitioners can recognize the relevant issues and associated problems. This 
turns out to be less l;roblematic than initially assumed. Resulting recommenda- 
tions that reflect the aforementioned theoretical arguments have been widely 
accepted and implemented. It seems that the new institutional economics of 
organization offers a valuable foundation not only for the understanding and 
explanation of a broad variety of organizational modes but also for practical 
advice in management decision making on organizational structures. 
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